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Bringing Fiction to Justice: Including Individual
Narrative in Judicial Opinions
by Valerie Karno*
I.

Introduction
As a fiction writer and a reader of judicial opinions, I have observed
that judicial opinion writing and fiction have many parallels--both are
narratives, both put order to perception, and both communicate from an
author to a reader through language. However, despite these lingual
similarities, I feel alienated when I read judicial opinions, and I tum to
fiction reading and writing for comfort and validation. And so
curiousity and frustration have led to this exploration. I want to know
what it is about judicial opinions that is alienating, and what it is about
fiction that is validating. I then want to incorporate the validating factors
of fiction into judicial opinions so I, and others like me, do not feel
alienated. It is possible to include previously excluded voices in judicial
opinions. We can do this by changing our medium of expression, and
integrating individual narrative into opinions. 1
In the next section of this article I examine what my voice is--and
how it is alienated due to gender socialization and identification. I
further discuss whether there exists a "feminine voice," and if so,
whether my voice is part of it. Section III explains how language is one
perpetual narrative--a narrative that creates and is created by my voice,
orders my perception, and defines my thoughts. Section IV considers
how language is transmitted through all writing, and how the differing
purposes of judicial opinion and fictional writing alter the way language
is communicated. In Section V, I conclude that my voice, as a voice
integrally related to gender, is better recognized by fiction. I propose in
sections VI and VII a solution to the alienating factors of judicial opinion
writing. The integration of fictional characteristics into judicial opinion

* B.A. (English) University of California at Berkeley, 1987. Member of the Hastings
Class of 1991. This essay is dedicated to all who feel they don't fit in. My very special
thanks to Janine Natter and Diane Bessette for their editorial assistance and loving
support, and to Professor Stephanie Wildman for helping me recognize the importance of
my own voice.
1. This paper is an example of including individual narrative voice in analytic writing.
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writing will dispel the alienation of my voice without undermining the
purpose of the judicial opinion.

II.

The "Feminine Voice"
Attempting any definition, or even acknowledging the presence of a
feminine voice can be very dangerous. The feminist movement has
been debating whether there is a feminine voice. The danger in defining
one essential voice is that any generalization is liable to over-encompass
or incorrectly categorize any single woman. Since the "movement" is
only a conglomerate of a mass of individuals, even subjecting one
woman to an improper description can be very devastating. So, as
Annette Kolodny originally suggested, I will undertake "treating each
author and each separate work by each author as itself unique and
individual."2 I will thus draw upon my own experiences as a woman, a
fictional writer, and a reader of judicial opinions to explain how I view
my voice, and how I feel it is treated in the varying genres of writing. I
believe my voice is one recognized by contrast, and one which
manifests itself in the outreach for other voices.
First, I premise my discussion on my belief that my experience as a
woman is integrally related to what my voice is. I was socialized
completely interdependently with my gender. I grew up being told that I
should see the world a certain way. Outwardly I was supposed to be
nice and soft and submissive; inwardly these concepts seeped into my
very language, and my very experience of the world. I saw the world as
my parents, and the culture they lived in, believed a girl should--from a
nice and soft and submissive perspective. The statement "Wear this
dress so you will look like a nice young lady" resounds in my ears even
today. I was supposed to let men open doors for me, but not myself
open doors for them because "that's just not the way a girl should act." I
remember staying inside, watching the guys play basketball outside, and
thinking "I'll stay here because I don't belong out there with them."
This historical account controls even the way I see the world today.
Whether I am rebelling against, or conforming to this gender-based
perspective, I still act from the framework of a gender-base, thus giving

2. Kolodny, Some Notes on Defming a "Feminist Literary Criticism,"
75, 79 (Autumn 1975).

CRITICAL

INQUIRY

BRINGING HCfION TO JUSTICE

79

it continued existence. 3 My socialization and my language have now
blended into a unique way of perceiving the world. The way I
particularly see the world is "my voice."4 My voice is my individual
outlook. It is the "me" that is my perspective. Since I do consider my
voice to be largely aproduGt ofmyge-nder, I shaH call1his my felllil!ine
voice.
Were all human voices to be the same, my voice would be
indistinguishable. However, I am aware of my unique voice and
perspective when I notice a contrast between my perception and
another's. Through difference I recognize individuality.
For example, when I read a judicial opinion and feel alienated, feel a
sense that "this does not involve me," I then am acutely aware of the
exclusion of my voice. When trying to decipher why I feel excluded, I
notice that the writing is stingingly objective. The lack of the author's
stated presence feels counter-intuitive to me--it seems a lie.
Furthermore, if "my voice" were "in" the opinion, it would pronounce
itself honestly and reach out to the other excluded "me's" who read this
strange language and feel a tug of "I'm not in here," but don't know
quite why. So, for me, my voice is a voice left out of judicial opinions,
wanting to include others, desiring to include all voices while not
subverting any individuality.
There are many theories regarding the existence and characteristics
of the feminine voice. I briefly explain them here to show the reader
that other people's unique voices perceive feminine voices as either
possessing shared characteristics, or retaining important distinctions.
First, one school of thought believes that defining a single feminist
voice is wrong. For example, some allege that pronouncing the
existence of a feminine voice only reinforces the female's indoctrination
into male categorization. The feminine voice could only exist as a
reiteration of the hierarchy between male and female. One typical claim
from this area of thought is that "[fJeminists are simply incorrect when
they claim the critique of absolutes as women's voice, since that critique
has been developed by men .... "5 People in this school prefer not to
define a feminine voice.
3. I am not saying that my entire perspective is based on gender, but since my
childhood was immersed in gender definition, I believe it is a controlling factor in my
outlook.
4. It has been suggested that language, and experience, is inherently gendered. See
Showalter, Introduction: The Rise of Gender, in SPEAKING OF GENDER 3-4 (E. Showalter ed.
1989).
5. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 843-44 (1989); See
generally Rhode, The "Woman's Point of View," 38 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 41-44

(1988).
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A second, and major school of thought does define a feminine
voice. This school characterizes the feminine voice as existing, and
arising from a fundamentally different manifestation than the male
lingual voice. Various reasons have been advanced for this distinct
manifestation. Carol Gilligan, developer m the archetype theory in this
field, attributes the difference of the feminine voice to women's desires
for relationships and connections. She distinguishes women from men
when she empirically concludes that " ... in the different voice of
women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the tie between relationship and
responsibility, and the origins of aggression in the failure of
connection. '>6 Gilligan bases her categorization of the feminine voice on
women's moral and social values.
Virginia Woolf attributes a different feminine voice to the historical
male creation of the standard lingual form. She states, for example, that
" ... the very form of the sentence does not fit her [woman]. It is a
sentence made by men .... And this [sentence] a woman must make
for herself, altering and adapting the current sentence until she writes
one that takes the natural shape of her thought without crushing or
distorting it."?
A third body of theorists believe that there is no definition of
feminine voice, but that mere undefinability does not preclude the
possibility of the existence of a feminine voice. They suggest that any
definition would be based on male discourse, and so would not be
uniquely feminine, but yet there may still be an undefinable, intangible
feminine voice. One typical statement in this body of theory is that, "It
is impossible to define a feminine practice of writing ... for this
practice can never be theorized, enclosed, coded--which doesn't mean
that it doesn't exist. But it will always surpass the discourse that
regulates the phallocentric system .... "8
Given the diversity of theories about the existence and attributes of
the feminine voice, I shall proceed throughout this paper analyzing how
my voice, which I perceive as being gender-related, is recognized in
6. C. GILUGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 173 (1982). See also Valian, Linguistics and
Feminism, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 155 (1977) for a discussion of how women's
writing empirically appears differently in the text than men's writing. See generally M.
BELENKY, B. CLINCHY, N. GOLDBERGER & J. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING (1986)
[hereinafter WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING] for empirical conclusions that a different voice
is related to mind, self, and experience.
7. V. WOOLF, WOMEN AND WRITING 48 (1979).
8. Cixous, The Laugh of the Medusa, in THE SIGNS READER 287 (1983). See also Lamont,
The Off· Center Spatiality of Women's Discourse, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEMINIST
LITERARY CRITICISM 141 (1982). (Lamont stresses the need for women to create their own
dissident "discourse.")
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writing. I do not suggest that my voice is a universal women's voice;
however, coinciding with all these theories, 1 see my voice as being
unique and difficult to describe within language. It is also the only
voice 1 know. 1 offer my experiences in this paper for women to both
find similarities to and distinctions from their unique veic-es, so that we
all may better get to know what each of our voices is, and, whatever
they may be, let them emerge.

III.

Voice, Language, & Narrative
1 will now describe the seemingly circular process of how language
and narrative are interwoven with perception of the world. 1 see the
world through my eyes, my perspective, my voice. However, my
perception occurs to me through thought in the form of ordered
language, or "narrative." In order to communicate or categorize an
experience to oneself or another, we use a string of ordered words.
This thought process is dualistic in that we have control over the
categorization by our choice of words, and yet language controls our
experience by restricting the ways in which we are able to perceive and
communicate our thoughts.
For example, all my thoughts occur to me in a narrated sentence
form ("I like this," "This is blue," "I am tired," etc.). For instance,
when I see a flower a number of processes occur. First, I identify the
object as a flower (unthinkingly categorizing my perception of an object
into an understandable ordered narration--"This is a flower."). Then 1
may think, "How beautiful." (my perspective on the flower which also
occurs to me through ordered language, or "narration."). However,
underlying this entire process is the fact that 1 could not have any of
these thoughts unless 1 have already seen the world that way. (I would
never know an object as a flower unless 1 had already been taught
through books, others, or stories, to use narrative language to categorize
it as a flower.) Thus language, "narration," is continually creating my
experience of the world, and yet my experiences of the world are
continually recreating the orderly narration of the world through my use
of language. Every thought occurs to me through the ordered narration
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that is language, and my perspective is an integral part of how that
narration occurs to me. Each one of us thus has a biased point of view. 9
Another example of this is the women's movement itself, which has
given a vocabulary to women's oppression. Before this new language
existed, there were 00 werds to say that women were being treated
unfairly. When women always washed dishes while men read the
paper, that was just how it was. Now there is a language to describe that
as unjust, and create an alternative. Women and men can now have a
new experience of the world, previously unavailable without the
language to describe it. Each of us can have a new point of view.
Much has been written on narration, but I want to stress that
narration frames perception into an easily understandable linear thought.
Steven Winter has written that narrative corresponds to the way "the
human mind makes sense of experience . . . . In narrative, we take
experience and configure it in a conventional and comprehensible
form."l0 Speaking of fictional narration, Winter has furthermore stated
that "the strategy of even the most unstructured narrative is to draw
upon the reader's natural urge to seek order and meaning ... ."ll
Language is one perpetual string of narratives about the way the
world is. It orders the world. As Anne Dillard explains, "[l]anguage ...
selects, abstracts, exaggerates, and orders .... [A] writer's language
does an airtight job of signifying his [sic] perceptions of things as they
are."12 More importantly, language orders each person's world uniquely
for that person. Each individual's perspective is encapsulated in her
formation of language, and her language then recurringly supports her
perspective. As Sartre observes, "We are within language as within our
body."13 Language is both "our shell and our antennae .... "14 Thus
the antennae of language investigate and order the world, and the shell
of language then protects and reaffirms the ordering.
The narration that is language then has voice, perspective, and
individuality from the outset. Lingual narration cannot by its very
definition be neutral or objective because individuals habitually reinforce
their unique way of perceiving the world. Every written text exemplifies
some authorial perspective on the world merely by its being a
9. See Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and Judging, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1945, 1949 (1988). (This bias should be revealed in one's writing or
language instead of hidden under the guise of a fictional objectivity.)
10. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the AGON Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989).
11. Id. at 2251.
12. A. DILLARD, LNING BY FICTION 70 (1982).
13. SARTRE, What Is Literature, in "WHAT IS LITERATURE?"
14.ld.

AND OTHER ESSAYS

35 (1988).
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manifestation of the author's internal narrative. As James Boyd White
explains:
Every text is written in a language, and the language always
entails commitments to views of the world--of oneself, ofone's
readers, and of others--with which the writer must somehow
come to terms. Similarly, every text is radically social: it always
defines a speaker, an audience, and a relation between them.
Every text thus creates a community and it is responsible for the
community it creates. 15
Thus, there exists no neutral description of an event. I6 There will
always be a written voice based on a biased, unique point of view.
If we want to change anything we must change not the external
manifestations of the individual biases, but the underlying cause of the
problem. We must change the way that language and narrative are
formed; we must alter the way that individual voices perceive the world.
Only through recognizing the way narration is formed can we change
the manner in which it is then physically projected. This is particularly
necessary for analyzing the reasons language is manifested so
disparately in judicial opinion and fictional writing.

IV.
The Transmission of Language into Writing
Every writing has an author, and is written with another, perhaps
called the "theoretical reader," in mind. There exists at least a dual
purpose in any writing, and the language of that writing reflects those
purposes. First, one writes to communicate something to another.
Second, one writes to fulfill oneself, perhaps by feeling that the writing
makes oneself an essential part of the world. 17
Within these common goals of all writing, each genre of writing has
its own purpose as well. The purpose of a writing controls how the
language of that writing is communicated. Delivery, tone, and syntactic
structure of the writing will vary with the differing purposes. 18

15. White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto," 39 MERCER L. REV. 739, 745 n.14
(1988).
16. Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152,
2165 (1989).
17. SARTRE, supra note 13, at 65.
18. R. BARTHES, WRITING DEGREE ZERO 15 (1977).
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For example, consider a love letter versus a collection notice. The
love letter has as its purpose the conveyance of intimacy coupled with
the desire to receive a returned communication of intimacy. The
author's presence in the writing is both known and strong. The reader
is desired to interpret the message as positive, loving, and caring. The
words of the letter indicate self involvement, and will often be emotive.
The letter has a subjective tone and can lack formal sentence structure.
The collection notice, however, has a different purpose, and is thus
written quite differently. The purpose of the notice is to declare
objectivity, to intimidate, to communicate the lack of compassion
available, and to evoke immediate responsive practical action. To
achieve this purpose the author is unidentified as a human being; there
exists seeming objectivity, and no feeling connection between author
and reader. There is no self involvement of the author. The letter is
written in short, unmistakable sentences. The tone is unrelenting and
unforgiving. These methods of writing are utilized to achieve the
purpose of the notice, as were the methods of the love letter used to
facilitate that purpose.
I use this extreme example as a foundation for showing that the
purposes of judicial opinion writing and fictional writing also dictate the
forms in which they are written. The manner in which these forms are
written, and the perceptions underlying this manner explain why they
either alienate or validate me.

V.
Judicial Opinion Writing Versus Fictional Writing

A. Judicial Opinion Writing
Judicial opinion writing has several purposes. First, the opinion is
meant to be authoritative and directive. The reader of the judicial
opinion is supposed to implement the statements therein declared. The
reader of the opinion is "its servant. "19 Since the opinion is supposed to
lead and command, the text is written with the reader in mind, and with
an aim to affect behavior.
In addition to directing new behavior, the opinion is written with the
purpose of maintaining a preconceived system smoothly and
consistently. Here the purpose extends beyond the mere reaction of the
individual, to abstract adherence to an overall scheme of analyzing rules.
19. J. WmTE, HERACLES' Bow 95 (1985).
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One way this adherence has been maintained is through stare decisis, the
judicial method of analysis.
As David Kairys summarizes, "one of the basic elements or
mechanisms of legal reasoning, stare decisis . .. embodies the notion of
judicial subservience to prior decisions or precedentS."20 While stare
decisis may help preserve a continuous system, the narrative behind the
minds of stare decisis users can be one of enclosure. If one perceives
the world within a framework of subservience to history, there exists
the danger that changes in the future will be slow coming, or nonexistent.
I, as a voice often alienated from opinion writing, am concerned
with this dilemma. If the writer is committed to viewing the world in an
alienating way, and then manifesting this vision in the writing, I have no
recourse; I will continue to be alienated. However, if I can change the
writer's underlying vision of the world, my voice may be recognized.
As I will suggest, one way of altering this underlying vision is by
changing the method of manifestation of the perception. By changing
how the perception is communicated, by utilizing a freer method of
expression, the underlying perception can slowly change also. There is
at least room for the basis of the perception to change.
Moreover, because of the need to provide widespread, uniform
authority, judicial opinions are often written in a feigned neutral tone.
The authorial voice and perception are ignored. Recognizing the judge
as an author with a personal voice and perspective will actually better
facilitate handling a multitude of divergent situations within the opinion
than does the current method of false objectivity. It is important to
acknowledge the truth of any situation if we are to change anything. As
I will later more fully develop, instead of pretending human
preconceptions do not exist, we should embrace, talk about, and
announce our perceptions. Only then can we dispell with them, and
truly become closer to a neutral governing.
Judith Resnik reminds us that "[a] judge is either male or female and
is of a particular race, class, and social position; the appearance of
neutrality, of evenhandedness, of impartiality is false comfort."21 When
I read an opinion the affected "neutrality" shuns my individual
perspective. James Boyd White, one of the founders of the Law and
Literature movement, has further explained that "the judicial opinion .. .
might be far more accurately and richly understood if it were seen .. .
20. Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POUTICS OF LAW 11 (D. Kairys compo 1982).
21. Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for our Judges,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1908 (1988).
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as a statement by an individual mind or a group of individual minds
exercising their responsibility to decide a case as well as they can ...
."22 We need a more honest acceptance of subjective authorial voice in
judicial opinions. Interestingly, the purpose of fictional writing allows
for this honest communication of voice.

B. Fictional Writing
Fiction allows for greater diversity and presence of voice because it
is not concerned with what is "objectively" real, if that exists at all.
Fiction instead openly addresses the author's, or another's, perception
of this or any other world. The author of a fictional narrative is free to
order the world as she chooses. 23 Publishing aside, this allows anyone
to be validated. 24
Fiction is inventive. The author has tremendous power to interact
with the text however she wants. She can insert the precise degree of
voice and description she desires. The author is "in control" of the
substance and the form of the work. She need not be a specialist to write
a fictional work. 25
Moreover, historically fiction has been accessible to politically
subverted individuals. For example, Virginia Woolf considered why
women wrote fiction. She inquires: "why did their [women's] art then
[in the eighteenth century], and why to some extent does their art still,
take the form of fiction?,,26 She answers by noting that "fiction was, as
fiction still is, the easiest thing for a woman to write. . . .,,27 Thus,
fiction's purpose has traditionally been the facilitation of individual
freedom of expression.
The reader of fiction has great power of interpretation. She is free to
perceive what she desires in the text since there is no directive force to
fiction. 28 This is unlike judicial opinions, where the reader is supposed
to glean a more narrow and direct message from the writing.

22. WHITE, supra note 19, at 4l.
23. DILLARD, supra note 12, at 56-57.
24. I am here only speaking of the act of writing and reading fiction. Publishing and
receiving recognition are much harder tasks, especially for disadvantaged and poor
people, since the dominant white male culture controls that aspect of writing. I do not
discuss that in the scope of this article.
25. DILLARD, supra note 12, at 77.
26. WOOLF, supra note 7, at 43.
27. [d. at 46. But see A. LoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 116 (1984) for a discussion of how
class and economic status control women's voices by making writing difficult.
28. See DILLARD, supra note 12, at 13, 77.
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Finally, and crucially, fiction potentially allows the reader to
experience the world from another perspective. Fiction, by supplanting
us with another narrative, allows us an escape from the normal limited
framework of narrative with which we each live. We are presented with
perceptions distinct from our QWll; and are invite-d to extend Otlfselves to
understand them. We are able to virtually enter another's perspective
and live her life. 29
Because fiction seems inherently to value the potentiality for
expressing and experiencing a multiplicity of voices, it has been
suggested it is anti-authoritarian in nature. 3D However, the realization
that we each exist in an internal perpetual narrative can create the
possibility that any kind of external manifestation of that narrative,
whether it be fictional or judicial, can encompass a myriad of voices.
When we realize that we have been trapped in our own way of seeing
the world, we can see that there is another way to perceive the world.
Recognizing the narrowness of our perception is also recognizing the
vastness of the perception we do not have. Once we then realize the
other possibilities of perception, we become more open to actually
seeing the world different ways. We become more willing to
acknowledge other voices. For example, once a white male judge
recognizes that his voice is inherently sexist and racist, he will, knowing
that there are voices he has not represented, better reach out to
understand and include these voices in his experience, and thus in his
writing.

C. Comparing Fictional & Judicial Narrative
Our internal narratives are manifested through the writing forms of
both fictional narrative and judicial narrative. At first glance these two
methods of writing seem quite different. Fictional narrative, sometimes
referred to as storytelling, helps us understand the being of others. It
presents diverse experiences and seems almost boundary-less in
content. Robin West, describing fictional storytelling, claims that
"[t]hrough . . . telling stories . . . , [w]e reach an empathic
understanding--a grasping--of the subjectivity, the pain, the pleasure,
the happiness, or the sadness of the other. "31
Judicial narrative seems to present more boundaries to relating
diverse perceptions. As Kim Lane Scheppele explains, "[t]he
29. DILLARD, supra note 12, at 11-12.
30. White, supra note 15, at 746.
31. West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REv. 867,
872 (1988).
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boundaries of legal narrative are not ftxed, but in many cases they might
as well be. Those who are experienced legal storytellers often do not
perceive themselves as having a choice .... The boundaries of legal
narratives are shaped powerfully by legal habit, a habit that has worked
to the disadvantage of outsklers,··32
However, this seeming limitation erroneously exists because of a
misguided notion about how to achieve the goals of the judicial opinion.
The legal institution that gives life to the judicial opinion is a
conglomerate of individuals living within narrative. The judicial opinion
is only another narrative about the way reality is. As I shall explain,
usurping some of the attributes of ftctional narrative into judicial
narratives can subvert "institutional logic," challenge the status quo, and
better include a multitude of voices previously excluded from
opinions. 33

VI.
My Voice in Judicial Opinions and Fictional Writings
A. My Voice in Judicial Writing
I here use my experience of alienation from judicial writing as a
basis for what I call "my feminine voice." My experience when I read a
judicial opinion is that my voice is not represented. My views, my
outlooks, and my interests are not in the opinion. I am not speaking
about the factual content of the writing; I am concerned with the
underlying narrative of the opinion writer describing the way the world
is. That underlying narrative permeates and is diffused throughout the
language and style used in the opinion. My narrative of how the world
is does not appear in the words or the style of that opinion. There have
been several theories proposed for why my voice, as a woman's voice,
is excluded from most judicial opinions.
First, some argue that because historically women have only
recently entered the judicial fteld, it is not surprising that women's
voices are often excluded and devalued in the law. Socially and
politically the law has been controlled almost solely by men. 34 A simple
32. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2094 (1989).
33. Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 2411, 2414-15, 2429, 2440 (1989).
34. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 44 (1985), quoting F. Olsen, The Sex
of Law (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
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remedy for this problem should be happening now. One would assume
that the increase of females in the legal profession would correlate with
the numbers of women judges, and thus the greater numbers of
women's perspectives emerging in the law. 35 However, this correlation
between women in the regal profession and women as judges may be an
optimistic misnomer. For example, in California, "of Deukmejian' s 907
[judicial] appointees, 88 percent have been white, and 85 percent
male.,,36 Thus, from a strictly numerical viewpoint, the emergence of
women's perspectives in judicial opinions may trail behind the
emergence of women in the overall legal profession.
Another rationale for the exclusion of my voice involves the male
and female polarity. One argument states that because male reasoning is
essentially logical, and women are concerned with relationships and
feelings, the "feminine voice" is not represented in judicial opinions. 37
This argument fails for me, since my voice is also very logical. This is
one example of how a theory may exclude some women by being
overbroad. Within this polarity there also exists the "we" versus "they"
dichotomy. This dichotomy suggests that anyone not "white and
privileged and male" would not naturally fit into the exclusive judicial
writing framework. The "'they' are the outsiders," including most
women's voices. 38
While penetrating the judicial system with women will eventually
help having my voice recognized, my solution is to work with
recognizing the truth of the underlying narrative of all people. Since
fictional writing is honest about narrative authorial presence, I tum to
that for aid.

B. My Voice in Fictional Writing
As an author and a reader, my feminine voice emerges much easier
in fictional writing than in judicial writing. This is precisely because the
purpose of fiction lets any voice in, even the voice that has been
alienated from other forms of writing. Just as the lack of women in the
judicial field promulgated the absence of women's voices in judicial

35. See Jd. at 42-3.
36. Schuyler, Bringing Diversity to the Courtroom, S.F. Weekly, Feb. 28, 1990, at 1,
col. 1.
37. See GILLIGAN, supra note 6, at 29-30. See also Massaro, Empathy, Legal
Storytelling, and The Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099,
2100 (1989).
38. Scheppele, supra note 32, at 2083-84.

90

HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.

[VOL. 2.77 1990]

writing, the more extensive female presence in fiction perpetuates
getting feminine voices, even if not one single voice, into writing.
The continued qualities of invention, authorial presence, and
authorial control provide the proper environment for a voice traditionally
excluded to emerge witftoot restraint. The woman's narrative, the
woman's voice, is precisely such a voice traditionally excluded. Where
feminine narratives could not enter authoritarian judicial writing, they
can resurface in a more "free form" style where the voice may be
whatever it is or desires to be. Fiction provides this atmosphere.

VII.
Bringing Fictional Attributes into Judicial Opinion Writing
Recognizing the differences between fictional and judicial writing
does not preclude challenging the underlying basis from which these
disparities arise. I will briefly mention a few of the critical differences
mentioned by scholars between the two modes of writing, and show
how understanding the foundation of these differences can bring
refreshing results.
Robin West claims that law and literature are irreconcilably different
because law "is imperative and literature is expressive."39 While this
distinction may exist, the goals of pronouncing authority and being
obeyed can be achieved in many ways. I shall argue that a more
expressive lingual structure in judicial opinions will actually enhance
cooperation with judicial decisions.
Steven Winter proposes that the law, in contrast to fiction, must be
generalizable, reliable, and evoke automatic validity.4o This too may be
true, but his conclusion that "narrative cannot fulfill these conditions"41
does not necessarily follow from his premise. Winters neglects to notice
that all communication is formed in a narrative--narrative is the medium
through which perception is ordered, given meaning, and understood.
We live in a narrative, each of us creating a story about how we think
the world is. Thus, judicial writing is already, eternally, a narrative.
Narrative can, and indeed does sustain the judicial process. By
recognizing this fact, we can attempt to shift the language within the
narrative, actually shift our framing of the way we think the world is, to

39. West, Adjudication is not Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law-asLiterature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 277 (1987).
40. Winter, supra note 10, at 2259-60.
41. Id. at 2260.
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better include others, and more efficiently account for the mass of voices
not currently represented.
Furthermore, Robin West argues that, unlike the fictional author,
judges must keep their subjective narrative instincts separate from
lawma king. 42 Precisely to the conttary, keeping the narrative instinct
away is impossible. Ignoring the fact of narration is lying about human
nature. What is lawmaking, if it is not addressing the conflicts that arise
due to human nature? We must embrace what our nature is and
understand it, so that we may honestly judge and resolve. Each judge
exists in her own narrative, and acknowledging this is essential to fair
judicial writing. Once a judge realizes the nature of her own biased
narrative, she will be opened to possibilities previously unknown, and
she can include others in her experience, presenting the feminine or
other alternative voice in her writing. Without this recognition, the judge
is actionless against the fact that she is not neutral. The judge need not,
however, feign neutrality and write a limited, biased narrative.
Awareness is the solution.
We can "construct a different sort of authority"43 by borrowing
attributes of fictional writing, and using them in judicial opinion writing.
We can do this, still maintain all the authority and control the judicial
opinion requires, and actually better control the system by bringing
under judicial authority those voices who previously seemed excluded. I
shall now discuss how this can be done.
First, judicial opinion writers should utilize greater inventive and
stylistic controL This will acknowledge the author as a person with her
own narrative, and this recognition can lead to the inculcation of more
voices in the writing. One concern that could arise is that the judge may
seem a dictator--an individual proscribing her own thoughts. However,
that judge has been proscribing her own thoughts under the guise of
neutrality throughout her judicial career. Revealing the actual truth can
be no detriment. Also, the judge's individual declarations will be
balanced out by the restrictions on power known as checks and
balances.
With this system, the author can still achieve great clarity of meaning
through varied styles. The author can also still receive limited reader
interpretation. Furthermore, the author can still rely on stare decisis
because that in itself is not the problem; the problem is the foundation of
language from which legal reasoning arises: that foundation must be
42. West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145,211 (1985).
43. WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING, supra note 6, at 221.
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surfaced and discussed to allow the emergence of voices not previously
recognized.
I present one concrete example to illustrate my point. A judge could
write, for instance, "I recognize my own bias in this case. I am not a
Black woman and I do not know what that would be like. However, I
am willing to try to understand. I realize precedent in this situation
dictates I convict the plaintiff of misrepresentation; I am bound to follow
that precedent and I will. I would like to note, though, that I would like
to find the plaintiff innocent if I could, and I suggest the Legislature take
steps to change the definition of misrepresentation. I am uncomfortable
with it the way it is." This opinion would take great strides in the use of
inventive style and the use of the personal voice. The decision is quite
clear, and would have little trouble being implemented or understood.
There is also a more limited interpretation available here than there is in
most ambiguously written objective decisions. One does not need to
consider what the falsely objective term "reasonable" means, for
instance. (Interpreting reasonableness inevitably becomes a subjective
judicial decision anyway. How could a white male judge know what is
reasonable to me?) The use of a different style only enhances the
meaning of the opinion.
Therefore, bringing fictional attributes to judicial decision writing
will facilitate the emergence of diverse perspectives in judicial writing.
By changing the medium of thought expression, alternative voices can
be included in judicial decisions. Opinions can then truly reflect the
melting pot of people residing in this country. This will be an incredible
step towards true representation of, and justice for, the people.

